Utah v. McClellan : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2005
Utah v. McClellan : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Marian Decker; Assistant Attorney General; Mark Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Counsel for
Appellee.
Margaret P. Lindsay; Counsel for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. McClellan, No. 20051048 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6142
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
AMMfl* 
CARL MCCLELLAN, Case No. 20051048-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR RAPE, A FIRST DEGREE 
FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-402 (1988). 
THE HONORABLE RAY M. HARDING, PRESIDING 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY 
99 East Center Street 
P.O. Box 1895 
Orem, Utah 84059-1895 
MARIAN DECKER (5688) 
Assistant x4ltorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
SHERRY RAGAN 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
Attorney for Appellant Attorneys for Appellee 
FILED 
UTAHAPPEL U T E C 0 U R T S 
A U G - 8 2007 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
CARL MCCLELLAN, Case No. 20051048-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR RAPE, A FIRST DEGREE 
FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-402 (1988), 
THE HONORABLE RAY M. HARDING, PRESIDING 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY 
99 East Center Street 
P.O.Box 1895 
Orem,Utah 84059-1895 
MARIAN DECKER (5688) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
SHERRY RAGAN 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
Attorney for Appellant Attorneys for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 7 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 13 
ARGUMENT 
I. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT MOVING TO 
DISQUALIFY THE ENTIRE UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
AFTER DEFENDANT'S PRE-TRIAL ATTORNEY TOOK A POSITION 
WITH THAT OFFICE; NOR DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN 
ERROR IN NOT SUA SPONTE DISQUALIFYING THE ENTIRE COUNTY 
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 16 
A. Defendant has not proven either Strickland prong 17 
1. Defendant has not shown that his trial counsel performed deficiently 17 
2. Defendant has not shown any prejudice 22 
B. Defendant has not shown plain error 23 
II. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE FOR 
NOT FURTHER QUESTIONING, CHALLENGING, OR USING A 
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE ON A JUROR WHO WAS A COURT 
EMPLOYEE AND HAD ALSO PREVIOUSLY WORKED WITH THE 
PROSECUTOR; NOR DID THE TRIAL COURT PLAINLY ERR IN NOT 
SUA SPONTE REMOVING THE JUROR 25 
i 
A. Defendant has not proven either Strickland prong 29 
1. Defendant has not shown that trial counsel performed deficiently 29 
2. Defendant also has shown no prejudice 35 
B. Defendant has not shown plain error 37 
III. DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BASED ON HIS 
CLAIM THAT HE WAS SURPRISED BY ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE—A 
RECORDING OF HIS POLICE INTERVIEW—WHERE HE NEVER 
SOUGHT A CONTINUANCE IN THE TRIAL COURT 38 
A. Because defendant did not request a continuance to meet the unexpected 
evidence, he is foreclosed from relief on appeal 40 
B. Defendant suffered no prejudice 43 
CONCLUSION 46 
ADDENDUM-UtahR. Prof 1 Conduct 1.7, 1.95 1.10, and 1.11 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 4 
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982) 31 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) 17, 18, 22,23,29, 35, 36 
STATE CASES 
Lux v. Commonwealth, 484 S.E.2d 145 (Va. App. 1997) 19, 20,23 
Reaves v. State, 574 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1991) 23 
State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, 153P.3d804 2,35,36,37 
State v. Blair, 868 P.2d 802 (Utah 1993) 43, 46 
State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, 25 P.3d 985 44 
State v. Brown, 355 S.E.2d 614 (W.Va. 1987) 33, 37 
State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992) 21 
State v. Bullock,19\ P.2d 155 (Utah 1989) 3 
State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, 122 P.3d 543 2, 23, 37 
State v. Gardner, 789P.2d273 (Utah 1989) 41 
State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50 (Utah 1993) 24 
State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879 (Utah 1988) 43 
State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, 70 P.3d 111 3 
State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262 (Utah 1998) 43 
State v. Holbert, 2002 UT App 426, 61 P.3d 21 2 
i i i 
State v. Kelly, 2000 UT 41, 1 P.3d 546 18, 22 
State v. King, 2006 UT 3, 131 P.3d 202 37, 44 
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987) 42, 45, 46 
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 12 P.3d 92 21, 29, 37 
State v. McKinney, 609N.E.2d613 (Ohio App. 1992) 31, 37 
State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51, 4 P.3d 778 24 
State v.Perez, 2002 UT App 211, 52 P.3d 451 2,40,42 
State v. Ramos, 882 P.2d 149 (Utah App. 1994) 32, 33, 37 
State v. Robertson, 2005 UT App 419, 122 P.3d 895 34, 35, 36 
State v. Rugebregt, 965 P.2d 518 (Utah App. 1998) 43 
State v. Simmons, 2000 UT App 190, 5 P.3d 1228 34, 36 
State v. Stenger, 760 P.2d 357 (Wa. 1988) 19 
State v. Tennyson, 850P.2d461 (Utah App. 1993) 17,23,36 
State v. Workman, 635 P.2d 49 (Utah 1981) 42 
State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839 (Utah 1988) 45 
FEDERAL STATUTES 
U.S. Const. Amend. VI 3 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402 (1988) cover page 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (West 2004) 1 
iv 
STATE RULES 
Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct 1.7, 1.9, 1.10 3, 18 
UtahR. App. P. 23B 7, 34 
OTHER WORKS CITED 
Wendy A. Reece, Professional Responsibility Switching Sides: Analyzing Lux v. 
Commonwealth—Does the Presence of a Criminal Defendant's Former 
Counsel in a Prosecutor's Office Require Disqualification of the Entire 
Office?, 21 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 431 (1991) 19 
v 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : 
CARL MCCLELLAN, : Case No. 20051048-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for rape, a first degree felony. This Court has 
jurisdiction of the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1(A). Was trial counsel constitutionally ineffective for not moving to 
disqualify the entire Utah County Attorney's Office after defendant's pre-trial attorney 
took a position with that office? 
Issue 1(B). Did the trial court commit plain error in not sua sponte disqualifying 
the entire county attorney's office? 
Issue 2(A). Was trial counsel constitutionally ineffective for not challenging or 
removing a juror who worked as a court employee, and who had also previously worked 
with the prosecutor? 
Issue 2(B). Did the trial court commit plain error in not sua sponte removing the 
juror? 
Standard of review. All of the above claims are unpreserved. Defendant thus 
raises them under the doctrines of plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel. See 
Aplt. Br. at 1-2. "When an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is raised for the first 
time on appeal without a prior evidentiary hearing, it presents a question of law." State v. 
Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, Tf 11, 153 P.3d 804 (quotation and citations omitted). 
However, "appellate review of counsel's performance [is] highly deferential." State v. 
Holbert, 2002 UT App 4265 f265 61 P.3d 21 (quotation and citation omitted). To show 
plain error, defendant must show "that the trial court committed an error that was both 
obvious and prejudicial." State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, % 24, 122 P.3d 543. 
Issue 3. Is defendant entitled to a new trial based on his claim that he was 
surprised by admissible evidence—a recording of his police interview—where he never 
sought a continuance in the trial court? 
Standard of review. "'[A] trial court's decision to admit or bar [evidence] for 
failure to adhere to discovery obligations lies within the trial court's discretion.5" State v. 
Perez, 2002 UT App 211, \ 24, 52 P.3d 451 (first brackets in original) (quoting State v. 
Begishe, 937 P.2d 527, 530 (Utah App. 1997)). However, a defendant confronted with 
unanticipated evidence, "essentially waive[s] his right to later claim error if [he] fails to 
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request a continuance or seek other appropriate relief." Id. at f^ 37 (case citation and 
quotation omitted) (first brackets in original). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . the Assistance 
of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. Amend. VI. 
Other pertinent rules include Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct 1.7, 1.9, 1.10, and 1.11, 
copies of which are attached in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Charge. Defendant was charged with first-degree rape in 1988. R21. 
Representation. Defendant was represented by the law firm of Aldrich, Nelson, 
Weight, and Esplin, and Phil Hadfield appeared with defendant at his 21 July 1988 
preliminary hearing and his subsequent arraignment. Rl-2, 19,24-25,293,316-15. Trial 
was set for August 2, but continued to August 29. R293, 315. 
On August 26—three days before trial—defendant appeared for a hearing on a 
defense motion to continue the trial again. R315, 293, 26-27. Defendant was represented 
at the hearing by another attorney from the same firm, James Rupper, because Hadfield 
had left the law firm to accept employment with the Utah County Attorney's Office, 
without telling defendant or seeking permission from the trial court to withdraw. Rl, 26, 
64, 293-92 & n.2, 315; R138:2, 7. Rupper sought the continuance "in order for defendant 
to have adequate representation." R315, 26. When the trial court explained to defendant 
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when the next available trial date might be and that he would need to waive his speedy 
trial right, defendant refused. R26-27, 292, 315; Rl38:1. 
Conviction. Trial went forth as scheduled, and the jury convicted defendant as 
charged. R67, 92-93, 112, 291, 315; R388:64. 
Sentence. The trial court imposed the statutory indeterminate term of five years 
to life. R90-93,291,315. 
New trial motion denied. On 3 October 1988, the trial court received a letter 
from defendant requesting a rehearing and listing alleged improprieties in his trial and 
sentencing, including his belief that trial counsel Rupper had not represented him "to his 
full extent[,]" that Hadfield left, and that Rupper had only a short time to prepare for trial. 
R94, 104, 291, 315. The trial court treated the letter as a Motion for a New Trial, and 
Rupper filed a formal memorandum in support of the motion. Rl 17-23, 291, 315. 
Rupper's memorandum additionally alleged that the trial court erred in admitting a tape 
recording of defendant's police interview because, although it was relevant, the probative 
value of the recording was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, the recording 
was not disclosed before trial and was therefore a surprise to defendant, and finally, the 
recording did not reflect that defendant was fully advised of his Miranda rights.1 Rl 17-
123. The parties' oral arguments were heard on 28 October 1988. R104-05. For the first 
time, Rupper raised the issue of a possible conflict of interest regarding Hadfield's 
lSee Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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association with both parties to the case, but defendant "stated for the record that he 
waivefd] any appearance of conflict." Id. The prosecutor thereafter filed a response 
addressing these and additional allegations that defendant was prejudiced by having 
women serve on the jury panel, and by having a female prosecutor and a female probation 
officer, and finally, that defendant was prejudiced because the jury was biased against 
him due to his race. See 113-115. 
An evidentiary hearing was held on 3 February 1989, where both defendant and 
Hadfield testified. R126, 290. The trial court filed its memorandum decision on February 
6 denying defendant's motion on several grounds: 1) defendant had the same notice as the 
prosecution of the existence of a tape recording of his police interrogation, introduction of 
the tape at trial was not prejudicial, and defendant's Miranda rights were not violated by 
the interrogation; 2) when Hadfield left, defendant was given counsel who was "relatively 
new to the case[,]" and defendant was offered and rejected a continuance of the trial; 3) 
there was no error in the presentence report, and the fact that it was prepared by a woman 
was irrelevant; 4) the jury panel was impartial and represented a fair cross-section of the 
community; and 5) in any event, if error existed, it was harmless. R127-28. 
Notice of appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on 22 February 1989. 
R130. Rupper withdrew as appellate counsel on 12 July 1990, Kent O. Willis appeared as 
defense counsel on 25 July 1990, and Don Elkins filed a substitution of counsel on 14 
August 1991. R289,315. 
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Dismissal for failure to prosecute. Following a delay in getting the record, this 
Court dismissed the appeal on 30 January 1992, because defendant failed to file a brief. 
R315,289, 145. 
Stipulation that defendant be re-sentenced. Pursuant to defendant's pursuit of 
post-conviction relief, the parties entered into a stipulation to have defendant re-sentenced 
nunc pro tunc. R314, 289-88. The district court issued an order on 24 May 1994, 
directing that defendant be re-sentenced. R288; R392:17. Re-sentencing, however, did 
not occur, and the order was never filed in the district court. R314, 288. 
Destruction of exhibits. Two years later, on 7 May 1996, the lower court issued a 
Notice of Intent to Dispose of Exhibits and Order. R314, 157-58. Because no objection 
was lodged, the court disposed of the evidence on or after 10 June 1996. R314, 289-288, 
157. 
Re-sentencing. Defendant eventually became aware of the re-sentencing order, 
and, in 2004, sought to enforce it. R314, 287. The district court appointed a public 
defender and ultimately ordered defendant re-sentenced in order to permit him to file a 
direct appeal. R 372-73, 314, 287; R392;passim. Re-sentencing occurred on 4 October 
2005, with the court continuing the original sentence and denying all the post-trial 
motions defendant had filed. R373. 
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Notice of appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from his re-sentencing 
on 3 November 2005. R378-75, and an amended notice of appeal on 10 November 2005. 
R380-79. 
Pour over order. The Utah Supreme Court poured the matter over to this Court 
on 13 December 2005. R586. 
Rule 23B remand denied. Defendant thereafter filed a motion for remand under 
rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to conduct an evidentiary hearing to 
develop a record in support of his ineffective assistance of counsel allegations, among 
others, that pre-trial counsel Hadfield and trial counsel Rupper rendered constitutionally 
deficient perfonnance in numerous respects. See Rule 23B Motion For Remand filed 15 
December 2006. The State opposed the motion. See State's Response in Opposition to 
Defendant's 23B Motion to Remand filed 20 February 2007. This Court denied the 
motion on the grounds that it was "based largely on the assertion of facts already of 
record/5 and also "fails to set forth any nonspeculative facts that establish ineffective 
assistance and resulting prejudice." See Order filed 5 March 2007. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant raped Judy Tidwell, a "profoundly deaf nineteen-year-old woman 
while she was home on her lunch break from her job at the American Fork Library. 
R317-16. 
* * * 
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On 5 July 1988, defendant was working as a salesman and sold cleaning products 
in Judy's neighborhood. R138:188-189. Defendant employed a sales pitch that included 
flattering comments to potential female customers. Rl38:142-43, 147. 200-01. 
Defendant approached two women who lived within a few houses of Judy. R138:141, 
146. Defendant asked Gwen Kegerreis if she was "'a model or something,'" and said, 
'"You look like you might be in Hollywood."5 R138:142. Defendant's flattery made 
Gwen feel "weird." Rl38:142-43. Similarly, when Verna Stockwell answered the door, 
defendant exclaimed, "cOh, you can't be the mother. You must be one of the daughters.'" 
R138:147. 
Defendant visited Judy twice that day, first between 1:00 and 1:30 p.m., and a 
second time at about 4:30 p.m. R138:70, 116, 189, 196. The first time, Judy was home 
alone; her family was on vacation in California. R138:55. Judy called her friend, 
Richard Scott, ate lunch, and went to her room. R3 8:66-67. While in her room, she heard 
someone come in the front door, but she did not hear a knock. R138:67, 82. Although 
she had impaired hearing, she could hear loud noises from room to room, and the front 
door had a metal security door that banged loudly. R138:53-54, 83. Judy thought her 
brother had come home for lunch, but when she came out of her room, defendant was 
standing in the house. R138:67. Judy was scared. Id. 
Defendant was wearing a gray, button-down shirt and gray pants with white lines. 
R138:69. He wore a nametag, which Judy did not read. R138:85. He had a bag of what 
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looked like cleaning supplies. R138:70-71. Defendant's voice was low and Judy had 
difficulty understanding him, and in reading his lips. R138:86. The first thing she 
understood was that defendant wanted her "to have sex with him.5' R138:67, 86. When 
she refused, defendant gave her a choice, "have sex now" or "[h]e [would] kill [her.]" 
R138:67. 
Judy just stood there, scared. Id. Defendant "grabbed . . . [her] arm, and he threw 
[her] into the living room." Id. He laid her on the couch, and "started to take off [her] 
clothes." Id. Defendant "took off his clothes" and Judy "closed [her] eyes after that 
because [she] didn't want to see him do it." R138:68. Defendant penetrated Judy twice, 
and liquid came out of his penis. R138:68-69, 95-96. Judy screamed, struggled, hit 
defendant in the stomach, and pushed him away. R138:68-69, 91. Judy dressed in the 
same clothes without cleaning herself and ran to her room. R138:70, 96. Defendant 
came to her door and tried to get her to come out. R138:70. She grabbed a baseball bat, 
came out of her room, and drove him off. R138:70. After the assault, Judy went to work. 
R138:72. 
Judy got off work at 4:00 p.m. and returned home. R138:72. She "locked the door 
behind [herself], and then [she] just went and sat down and watched TV . . . to do 
something." R138:72. "Then [she] heard a door knock, and [she] thought that it could be 
[her] brother Dennis knocking on the door . . . ." R138:72, 119-20. Judy opened the door, 
but instead of her brother, it was defendant. R138:73. Just then, the phone rang and Judy 
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answered it. R138:73. When she finished, she "turned around and he was standing right 
by [her]." Id. Defendant asked for a drink of water (R138:196), and Judy gave him one. 
R138:73, 120. Then defendant "picked [her] up" and "squeezed [her] hard." R138:73. 
Fortunately, Judy told defendant her brother was coming and he "dropped [her] on the 
floor and then . . . left." Judy locked the door and "was just scared to talk to anyone." 
R138:73. 
Judy reported the rape that evening, and was examined for sexual assault. 
R138:126, 168. There was, thus, a twelve-hour delay in taking physical samples for 
testing. R138:128-29, 139. The examining physician found no evidence of external 
injuries other than a bruise on her inner right thigh that appeared to be several days old. 
R138:126. The doctor also noted that the inner lip of the labium minora was slightly 
reddened, but that the hymen was not torn. R138.T26-28. The doctor determined that 
fluid from Judy's vagina was negative for sperm. R138:128. Although the physical 
evidence was inconclusive, including a lack of seminal fluid, nothing the doctor observed 
was inconsistent with Judy's history. Rl38:128-29. Moreover, a criminalist at the Utah 
State Crime Lab testified that approximately 40% of rape cases are negative for seminal 
fluid; therefore, the results in this case were not unusual. R138:137-38. 
The next morning, 6 July 1989, Judy was interviewed by police. R138:168. She 
was "[s]omewhat confused," and "unsure of herself." Id. at 169. Judy told police that her 
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attacker did not ejaculate, but the police "doubted whether she even knew the definition.55 
Id. at 181-82. Judy also doubted she could identify her attacker. Id. at 182. 
However, when officers met with her the next morning, on 7 July 1989, they 
showed Judy pictures of individuals who had applied for sales licenses in American Fork. 
Although she could not positively identify defendant, Judy "made some indications55 that 
defendant's picture "was similar.55 R138:75, 170-71. One of the officers noticed some 
redness on Judy's upper arm. Id. at 172. 
During a follow-up interview later that day, Lieutenant Tarry Fox noticed four 
finger-shaped bruises on Judy's upper left arm. Id. at 114. Judy told Lieutenant Fox that 
defendant did not ejaculate, but that he penetrated her twice. Id. at 119. 
On 8 July 1989, police showed Judy a photo lineup of salesmen working in 
American Fork on the day of the rape. Id. at 171. Judy picked out defendant's picture. 
Id. at 172. Sergeant Cornia noted that the redness on Judy's upper arm had turned into a 
bruise. Id. 
Later that day, Detective Ron Allen worked with Judy to prepare a composite 
drawing of therapist. Id. at 159-60. Detective Allen observed that Judy "was visibly 
shaken at the composite . . . ." Id. at 161. Detective Allen also testified that Judy had a 
good recollection of what her assailant looked like and gave specific descriptions. Id. In 
his opinion, Detective Allen felt something had happened, and that when found the 
assailant "would look very much like the composite." 
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That same day, the police picked up defendant in Orem and transferred him to 
American Fork. Id. at 163-64. Lieutenant Fox interviewed defendant in the presence of 
Officer Eckersley. Id. at 114-15; R388:9. Defendant initially stated that he had been to 
Judy's house only once at around 1:15 p.m. R138:116. When challenged, defendant 
admitted to lying. Id. at 116; R388:29-30. 
Defendant's version. At trial, defendant denied ever telling Lieutenant Fox that 
he had only been to Judy's house one time. Rl38:200. However, after the State played 
sections of his recorded police interview for the jury, defendant acknowledged that he had 
admitted lying during the police interview. R3 88:29. 
Defendant also testified that he did not enter Judy's house on his first visit. 
R138:192. Rather, he claimed only to have given his sales pitch, and asked if anyone else 
had been around trying to sell the cleaning product, and otherwise conversed with Judy. 
R138-.190, 193. Specifically, defendant asked Judy if she had a boyfriend. R138:198. 
According to defendant, he meant the question as a compliment. Rl38:202. He claimed 
that Judy offered him her telephone number, and that he thought she just wanted 
attention. R138: 193,198. At some point during the conversation, defendant learned that 
Judy's parents were on vacation. R138: 197-98. Defendant also noticed that Judy was 
wearing a hearing aid, but claimed that they had no problem communicating. R138:198. 
On his second visit, defendant claimed to have entered Judy's house "because she 
was going to give [him] a glass of water." R138:199. According to defendant, he was 
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"walking past'5 and "just asked her for a glass of water." R138:196. He claimed his 
supervisor instructed him to go back down Judy's street to cover ground that another 
salesman, who was inexperienced, had worked. R138:194. 
Although defendant told police that he and Judy were "fooling around," at trial, he 
denied touching Judy in any manner. R138:l 17, 193, 197; R388:18. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. Defendant asserts that because pre-trial counsel Hadfield had a conflict of 
interest, the entire Utah County Attorney's Office had a conflict of interest when he 
became employed there and should have been disqualified from this case. Defendant 
argues that his trial counsel was therefore ineffective for not moving to disqualify the 
county attorney's office and that the trial court plainly erred in not doing so sua sponte. 
The majority of jurisdictions recognize that, unlike attorneys in a civil firm, an entire 
county attorney's office is not disqualified merely because one of its members formerly 
represented the defendant, so long as the prosecutor with the conflict of interest is 
screened. Here, the record suggests that Hadfield was in fact screened from this case 
after he accepted employment with the county attorney's office. Thus, absent any 
contrary evidence, defendant's assertion that Hadfield's conflict of interest should be 
imputed to the entire county attorney's office lacks merit. Accordingly, trial counsel 
Rupper was not constitutionally ineffective for not moving to disqualify the entire Utah 
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County Attorney's Office, and the trial court did not plainly err in failing to do so sua 
sponte. 
Point II. Defendant asserts that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for 
not using a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who was the court administrator's 
secretary and had also previously worked with the prosecutor. He alternatively asserts 
that the trial court plainly erred in not sua sponte removing the juror for cause. A trial 
counsel's retention of a particular juror is presumed to be a conscious choice or 
preference. Because the process of jury selection is highly subjective, it is further 
presumed that counsel performed effectively in selecting the jurors. These presumptions 
can be rebutted only by evidence that trial counsel was inattentive or indifferent during 
the selection process, or that a prospective juror expressed bias so strong that no plausible 
countervailing subjective preference could justify the juror's retention. Here, defendant 
has not pointed to any such evidence or deficiency in trial counsel's performance. Nor 
can he. The potential juror expressed no strong bias, and trial counsel actively 
participated in the selection process. For instance, he unsuccessfully challenged and 
ultimately used a peremptory challenge on another juror who was also a court employee. 
It is thus reasonable to infer that trial counsel discerned some qualitative difference 
between the two jurors. 
Additionally, in this context, defendant can only demonstrate prejudice if he can 
show that counsel's alleged deficiency resulted in a biased juror sitting. Defendant 
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provides no authority that jurors who are court employees, or jurors that have previously 
worked with the prosecutor, are biased as a matter of law. He therefore fails to 
demonstrate that the disputed juror was biased or that any prejudice occurred. He thus 
fails to show that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. 
For essentially the same reasons, defendant also fails to show that the trial court 
plainly erred in not sua sponte removing the juror. Indeed, it is generally inappropriate 
for a trial court to interfere with counsel's conscious choices in the jury selection process. 
Because neither the juror's current nor past employment gave rise to a bias or conflict so 
strong or unequivocal as to inevitably taint the trial process, and because the juror assured 
the court that nothing in her work experience would make it difficult to be fair or 
impartial in this case, the trial court properly refrained from overruling trial counsel's 
strategy. 
Point III. Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in admitting a recording of 
his police interview on rebuttal because the prosecution team had not disclosed before 
trial that the interview had in fact been recorded. Defendant, however, also agreed that 
the recording was admissible for rebuttal purposes, but did not ask for a continuance to 
meet the claimed surprise. His allegation of error due to surprise on appeal is thus 
foreclosed. In any event, defendant suffered no prejudice. Defendant and trial counsel 
were fully aware before trial that defendant was interviewed and the substance of his 
statements. The recording was admitted only to rebut or impeach defendant's trial 
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testimony wherein he disagreed with the earlier testimony of the interviewing officer 
regarding his recollection of the interview. Rebuttal evidence is not the kind of surprise 
testimony that justifies a new trial. Moreover, defendant does not assert that he would 
have conducted his defense differently if he had known of the recording before trial. 
Defendant thus fails to show that he is entitled to a reversal on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT MOVING 
TO DISQUALIFY THE ENTIRE UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY'S 
OFFICE AFTER DEFENDANT'S PRE-TRIAL ATTORNEY TOOK 
A POSITION WITH THAT OFFICE; NOR DID THE TRIAL 
COURT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN NOT SUA SPONTE 
DISQUALIFYING THE ENTIRE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
In Point I of his brief, defendant asserts that "his right to due process and 
competent counsel were violated by his [pre-trial] attorney's (Hadfield's) abandonment of 
his representation for employment with the prosecuting agency immediately prior to 
trial." Aplt. Br. at 20-21. Defendant thus asserts that trial counsel Rupper, "was 
ineffective in failing to move the court to disqualify the Utah County Attorney's Office 
due to Hadfield's conflict of interest," and that the trial court plainly erred by not sua 
sponte moving "to disqualify the Utah County Attorney's office." Aplt. Br. at 21. 
The State does not dispute defendant's assertion that pre-trial counsel Hadfield had 
a conflict of interest in this case, given his prior representation of defendant. See Aplt. 
Br. at 24 (citing Utah Rules of Professional Conduct). However, because it is pre-trial 
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counsel Hadfield and not trial counsel Rupper who had the conflict of interest, defendant 
must do more than merely assert that Hadfield had a conflict of interest. Rather, the only 
way defendant can prevail is to show that Hadfield was not screened from the instant 
prosecution when he took a position with the county attorney's office. The record, 
however, suggests that Hadfield was in fact screened. To the extent it does not, record 
gaps are resolved in favor of trial counsel's effectiveness. Defendant thus cannot show 
that his trial counsel performed ineffectively or that the trial court plainly erred. 
A. Defendant has not proven either Strickland prong. 
To prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness claim, defendant must "show 
that counsel's performance was deficient" am/that "the deficient performance prejudiced 
the defense." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A failure to establish 
either prong defeats the defendant's claim. See id. at 687, 697. 
1. Defendant has not shown that his trial counsel performed 
deficiently. 
To satisfy the first Stricklandprong, defendant "must show that counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 688. "Nonetheless, this court will not second-guess trial counsel's legitimate strategic 
choices, however flawed those choices might appear in retrospect." State v. Tennyson, 
850 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah App. 1993). Rather, a defendant must "overcome the strong 
presumption that counsel's performance fell 'within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance' and that 'under the circumstances, the challenged action "might 
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be considered sound trial strategy.'"" Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Because 
of Strickland''s "strong" presumption, this Court "need not come to a conclusion that 
counsel, in fact, had a specific strategy in mind." Id. at 468. There need only be "some 
plausible strategic explanation for counsel's behavior." Id. Indeed, "an ineffective 
assistance claim succeeds only when no conceivable legitimate tactic or strategy can be 
surmised from counsel's actions." Id. (Emphasis added). Finally, counsel need not make 
futile objections. See State v. Kelly, 2000 UT 41, f 26, 1 P.3d 546. 
Contrary to defendant's assertion on appeal, the record does not support that trial 
counsel was deficient for not moving to disqualify the entire county attorney's office. 
Rather, as will be shown below, the record suggests that Hadfield was in fact screened 
from the instant prosecution after he took a position with the county attorney's office. 
Therefore, any such motion would have been futile. 
As a general rule, a lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter may 
not represent another client in the same or substantially related matter. See, e.g., Utah R. 
Prof 1. Conduct 1.7, 1.9, 1.10, and 1.11.2 Moreover, in a criminal context, due process is 
violated when, "subsequent to the establishment of an attorney-client relationship, the 
attorney participates in the prosecution of his former client." Lux v. Commonwealth, 484 
2Copies of these rules are attached in the addendum. Although rule 11.1 governs 
"special conflicts of interest for former and current government employees," the rule is 
focused more on the circumstance of where a government lawyer enters private practice, 
rather than where a defense attorney accepts a position with a government agency. 
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S.E.2d 145, 150 (Va. App. 1997). There is no due process violation, however, "when the 
defendant's lawyer-turned prosecutor has knowledge of relevant client confidences but is 
screened from participating in the defendant's prosecution." Id. Although Utah has not 
decided this specific issue, "[t]he majority of jurisdictions do not per se disqualify the 
entire prosecutor's office solely because one member of the staff had represented the 
defendant in a related matter." Id. at 151 (collecting cases). See also Wendy A. Reece, 
Professional Responsibility Switching Sides: Analyzing Lux v. Commonwealth—Does 
the Presence of a Criminal Defendant's Former Counsel in a Prosecutor's Office Require 
Disqualification of the Entire Office?, 21 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 431 (1997) (same). Rather, 
the majority of jurisdictions "permit another prosecutor to handle the case if the 
defendant's former counsel has been effectively screened from participating in the 
prosecution." Lux, 484 S.E.2d at 150-51. The policy undergirding the majority view is 
that "a prosecutor's public duty to seek justice rather than profits in combination with an 
effective 'Chinese wall' provides an adequate safeguard against the improper disclosure of 
a defendant's confidences. Id. at 151. Accord State v. Stenger, 760 P.2d 357, 361 (Wa. 
1988) (recognizing that when there is effective screening "then the disqualification of the 
entire prosecuting attorney's office is neither necessary nor wise"). Further, "aper se rule 
results in the unnecessary disqualification of prosecutors in cases where the risk of a 
breach of confidentiality is slight and inhibits the ability of prosecuting attorney's offices 
to hire the best possible employees." Lux, 484 S.E.2d at 151 (citation omitted). 
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Accordingly, the Virginia Court of Appeals adopted a "case-by-case approach" that 
allows for the protection of a defendant's due process concern or "the disclosure of 
confidences revealed to his attorney during the attorney-client relationship—while 
avoiding unnecessary disqualifications and other disruptive effects that a per se rule 
would have on [county attorney's] offices." Id. While ethical rules should strive to 
"avoid the appearance of impropriety," the Virginia court correctly recognized that "a 
criminal defendant's constitutional right to due process does not entitle him to a 
prosecution free of such appearances." Id. (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 
(1980)). Rather, "a criminal defendant is denied due process only when his former 
counsel joins a [county attorney's] office and is not effectively screened from contact 
with the [county's] attorneys who are handling the defendant's case on a related matter." 
Id. 
Here, there is no nonspeculative evidence—and defendant makes no 
assertion—that Hadfield was not effectively screened. See Aplt. Br. at 20-25. Indeed, 
defendant does not assert, and there is no indication, that Hadfield disclosed any 
confidences of defendant's to the trial prosecutor. Id. Moreover, the record supports that 
the trial judge and both parties were aware of the situation and were satisfied that 
everything was done appropriately so as to avoid any due process concern. All were fully 
aware of Hadfield's withdrawal prior to trial, and all acted appropriately to ensure that 
defendant would not be prejudiced by Hadfield's withdrawal so close to trial: the 
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prosecutor did not object to a continuance, the trial court was willing to grant one, and 
Rupper actively pursued one. R26-27, 112. Days later, the prosecutor properly took the 
precaution of mentioning Hadfield to the jury to identify and resolve any potential 
problem which might have arisen from Hadfield's prior involvement in the case. R138:7. 
The absence of any follow-up or objection by the trial court or Rupper speaks volumes of 
the fact that the situation was not a surprise to them and that it had been dealt with in a 
way that warranted no reaction at that point. As noted previously, nothing indicated that 
Hadfield had any continued involvement in the case, and defendant presents nothing. See 
Aplt. Br. at 20-25. See also State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 858 (Utah 1992) (emphasizing 
it is "simultaneous" or "dual representation" that "erodes public confidence in the 
criminal justice system"). 
Finally, both defendant and Hadfield testified under oath at a post-trial hearing on 
defendant's motion for new trial. R126 (minute entry of 3 February 1989 hearing); R290 
(excerpt from defendant's new trial motion). Although the recordings of this hearing 
were apparently destroyed, defendant did not support his failed motion for a rule 23B 
remand with an affidavit from either trial counsel Rupper, who represented him at the 
hearing, or pre-trial counsel Hadfield, concerning the substance of Hadfield's testimony 
at that hearing. See Rule 23B Motion for Remand dated 15 December 2006, and Order 
dated 5 March 2007. In this ineffectiveness context, gaps in the record are defendant's 
burden. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 16, 12 P.3d 92 ("[W]e now hold as 
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follows: where, on direct appeal, defendant raises a claim that trial counsel was 
ineffective . . . defendant bears the burden of assuring the record is adequate"). "The 
necessary consequence of this burden is that an appellate court will presume that any 
argument of ineffectiveness"—or as in this case, ineffectiveness and plain 
error—"presented to it is supported by all the relevant evidence of which [the] defendant 
is aware." Id. at Tf 17. Thus, any "ambiguities or deficiencies . . . simply will be construed 
in favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively." Id. This presumption accords 
with the "fundamental policies dictated by Strickland" that "'court[s] must indulge a 
strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance,'" Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689), "and with the general 
rule that record inadequacies result in an assumption of regularity on appeal." Id. (citation 
omitted). 
Based on the above, defendant has not established that Hadfield was not screened 
here, or that any due process violation occurred. Accordingly, defendant cannot show 
that a motion to disqualify the entire county attorney's office would have been successful, 
or that trial counsel Rupper rendered constitutionally deficient performance in not so 
moving. See Kelly, 2000 UT 41, \ 26. 
2. Defendant has not shown any prejudice. 
Defendant likewise has not proven that trial counsel Rupper's alleged deficient 
performance prejudiced him. Strickland's prejudice prong can be met "only by showing 
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there is a reasonable probability that 'but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different.'" Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 466 (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). If defendant could show that Hadfield was not screened 
from the instant prosecution after he joined the county attorney's office, presumably he 
could also establish prejudice. Cf. Lux, 484 S.E.2d at 576 (holding, in a case not 
involving a claim of ineffectiveness, that commonwealth failed to meet its burden of 
proving that it had implemented effective screening procedures to prevent the disclosure 
of Lux's confidences; therefore, trial court abused its discretion when it denied Lux's 
motion to disqualify the commonwealth's attorney); Reaves v. State, 514 So.2d 105, 107 
(Fla. 1991) (per curiam) (stating that failure to properly screen a prosecutor who is 
disqualified may require disqualification of the entire state attorney's office). However, 
for the same reasons defendant has not shown deficient performance, he has not shown 
prejudice. As set forth above, the record suggests that Hadfield was screened from the 
instant prosecution. Defendant has not carried his burden of proving otherwise. 
B. Defendant has not shown plain error. 
Defendant alternatively claims that the trial court plainly erred in not sua sponte 
disqualifying the entire Utah County Attorney's Office. Aplt. Br. at 21. To show plain 
error, a defendant must show "that the trial court committed an error that was both 
obvious and prejudicial." State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, \ 24, 122 P.3d 543. "The prejudice 
test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims is equivalent to the harmfulness test 
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applied in assessing plain error." State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51, If 10, 4 P.3d 778. If any 
one prong is unmet, the others need not be addressed. See State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 
50,61 (Utah 1993). 
For the same reasons that defendant has not shown that trial counsel Rupper was 
constitutionally ineffective, he has not shown that the trial court plainly erred in not sua 
sponte disqualifying the entire county attorney's office. As set forth in Point 1(A), supra, 
the record suggests that Hadfield was in fact screened from the instant prosecution after 
he joined the county attorney's office. No evidence to the contrary has been presented. 
Therefore, no error occurred here, let alone an obvious and prejudicial due process 
violation. Defendant's plain error claim may be rejected on any one of these grounds. Id. 
* * * 
In sum, defendant's mere assertion, without more, that because pre-trial counsel 
Hadfield had a conflict of interest, "the Utah County Attorney's Office also had a conflict 
of interest and should have been disqualified from this case," is unavailing. Aplt. Br. at 
24. First, as set out above, the majority of jurisdictions recognize that unlike attorneys in 
a civil firm, an entire county attorney's office is not disqualified merely because one of its 
members formerly represented the defendant, so long as the prosecutor with a conflict of 
interest is screened. Second, the record suggests that Hadfield was in fact screened here. 
Thus, absent any contrary evidence, defendant's assertion that Hadfield's conflict of 
interest should be imputed to the entire county attorney's office lacks merit. Trial counsel 
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Rupper was not constitutionally ineffective for not moving to disqualify the entire Utah 
County Attorney's Office, and the trial court did not plainly err in failing to do so sua 
sponte. 
POINT II 
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY 
INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT FURTHER QUESTIONING, 
CHALLENGING, OR USING A PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE ON 
A JUROR WHO WAS A COURT EMPLOYEE AND HAD ALSO 
PREVIOUSLY WORKED WITH THE PROSECUTOR; NOR DID 
THE TRIAL COURT PLAINLY ERR IN NOT SUA SPONTE 
REMOVING THE JUROR 
In Point II of his brief, defendant asserts that Juror Williams, a court employee 
who had also worked with the prosecutor, was biased and had a per se conflict of interest. 
Aplt. Br. at 26 (characterizing Juror Williams as "an individual who had a conflict of 
interest"); see also Aplt. Br. at 29-30. Accordingly, defendant asserts that his trial 
counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in not further questioning, challenging, 
or using a peremptory challenge on Juror Williams, and that the trial court committed 
plain error in not sua sponte removing the juror. Aplt. Br. at 26, 30. 
Proceedings below. During voir dire, the trial court asked the venire panel if they 
knew any of the attorneys or witnesses associated with the prosecutor. R138:8; see also 
id, at 7. Juror Johnson lived next door to Officer Cornia, who would be testifying for the 
prosecution. Id. at 8. He expressed that "[i]t might be a problem," when asked if his 
relationship to the officer would make it difficult to be fair and impartial. Id. at 8-9. 
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Juror Douglas knew the prosecutor through her work as a clerk at the Spanish Fork 
Circuit Court. Id, at 9. She denied that her relationship with the prosecutor would "create 
a problem for [her] in acting fairly and impartially as a juror.55 Id. Juror Powell knew a 
prosecution witness, but expressed that it would not affect her ability to be fair and 
impartial. Id. at 10. Juror Williams had worked with the prosecutor "for a few months a 
few years ago.55 Id. She responded negatively when asked if there was "anything in that 
relationship which would make it difficult for [her] to act fairly and impartially as a 
juror.5' Id. Finally, Juror Mulenstein knew the County Attorney, Steven Killpack, but 
denied that the acquaintance would impede her ability to be fair and impartial. Id. at 11. 
Next, the trial court asked the jury venire if they knew any of the attorneys or 
witnesses associated with the defense. Juror Douglas was familiar with defendant 
through her work as a court clerk, but again denied that it would make it difficult for her 
to be fair and impartial. Id. at 12. No other jurors indicated that they knew the defense 
attorneys or witnesses. 
The trial court also asked the venire panel if they had close family members who 
worked as police officers, or if they had close friends who worked in law enforcement. 
Only Juror Johnson responded, again expressing that he was friendly with Officer Comia. 
Id. at 14. 
Finally, several jurors expressed that they were acquainted with each other, but no 
juror expressed that it would impede their ability to be fair and impartial. Id. at 14-17. 
26 
Several jurors indicated that they had read and heard about the rape charge from various 
media sources, but none of them thought it would affect their ability to be fair and 
impartial. Id. at 18-20. All jurors responded negatively when asked if defendant's race 
would affect their impartiality. Id. at 20. 
When the jurors introduced themselves to the parties, Juror Douglas again 
indicated that she was a clerk at the Spanish Fork Circuit Court. Id. at 23. Juror Williams 
said she was "a secretary to the court administrator here in the district court." Id. at 26. 
At the conclusion of the trial court's voir dire, the trial court asked if the parties 
had any additional questions for the venire panel. Id. at 29. Defendant's trial counsel 
asked to probe Juror Johnson about his friendship with Officer Cornia. Id. In response, 
the trial court stated, "You won't need to counsel." Id. 
Trial counsel indicated that he also had additional questions for Juror Douglas 
concerning her position as a court clerk. Id. Trial counsel was concerned that given Juror 
Douglas's experience in the "court area," the other jurors "may look more to her for 
leadership." Id. at 31. 
Trial counsel also asked Jurors Edwards and Hazlett, who were both from 
American Fork," if the fact that the victim was also from American Fork would influence 
them in any way, which they denied. Id. Trial counsel then asked whether any of the 
venire members knew the victim. Id. at 33. Finally, trial counsel asked whether the fact 
that the victim was white and defendant was black would cause jurors to credit the 
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victim's testimony over that of defendant, and whether the fact that defendant was from 
an urban area, Chicago, would cause them to treat him differently. Id. at 33-34. 
Following jury selection, the trial court made a record of the fact that it had 
"agreed at bench that [Juror] Johnson could be excused for cause on motion of plaintiff." 
Id. at 38. The trial court also noted that trial counsel had submitted written questions for 
the jury, and that it had given "those which it felt was appropriate and denied giving any 
of those which it had not expressly given or given through implication and other 
instructions." Id. The trial court specifically noted that with reference to the "handicap 
of the prosecutrix," the trial court would give "its standard instruction to the jury about 
not being influenced by the prejudices or unfairness, and it should reflect any verdict 
based thereon." Id. The trial court then asked if trial counsel wanted to make any other 
"express exception," to which trial counsel responded affirmatively. Id. Trial counsel 
then took exception to the trial court's refusal to ask whether the venire panel would have 
been sympathetic to the victim given her deafness, and also noted that the trial court had 
overruled his motion to challenge Juror Douglas for cause, due to her employment as the 
clerk of the Spanish Fork Circuit Court. Id. at 38-39. 
As can be seen, trial counsel actively participated in selecting the jury. He 
submitted written questions to the trial court, made one unsuccessful challenge for cause, 
and may well have moved to challenge Juror Johnson, but the trial court indicated that it 
would not be necessary as he was already planning to excuse that juror. Trial counsel 
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also suggested that the trial court specifically inquire into questions of race, disability, and 
urban versus rural attitudes. Finally, trial counsel used all four of his peremptory 
challenges. See R63. Specifically, trial counsel peremptorily challenged Jurors Douglas, 
Edwards, Hazlett, and Smith. Id. The prosecution likewise used all four of its 
peremptories, removing Jurors Gates, Millet, W. Johnson, and Clark. Id. No one 
removed Juror Williams and she sat on the jury. 
A. Defendant has not proven either Strickland prong. 
Defendant argues that trial counsel performed deficiently for failing to further 
question, challenge, or use a peremptory challenge on Juror Williams. Aplt. Br. at 30-32. 
To prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness claim, defendant must "show that 
counsel's performance was deficient'"and that "the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. A failure to establish either prong defeats the 
defendant's claim. See id. at 687, 697. 
1. Defendant has not shown that trial counsel performed 
deficiently. 
As set out more fully in Point 1(A)(1) of this brief, to satisfy the first Strickland 
prong, defendant "must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness." Stickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Additionally, when, the 
ineffectiveness claim is that trial counsel failed to object to or remove a particular juror, 
"the Strickland standard requires the appellate court to make two distinct presumptions." 
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ 20, 12 P.3d 92. First, "trial counsel's lack of 
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objection to, or failure to remove, a particular juror is presumed to be the product of a 
conscious choice or preference." Id. Second, "because the process of jury selection is a 
highly subjective, judgmental, and intuitive process, trial counsel's presumably conscious 
and strategic choice to refrain from removing a particular juror is further presumed to 
constitute effective representation." Id. In short, an "appellate court will presume that 
counsel's lack of objection to, or failure to remove, a particular juror was the result of a 
plausibly justifiable conscious choice or preference." Id. at ^ 25. 
To rebut these presumptions, defendant must show that (1) "defense counsel was 
so inattentive or indifferent during the jury selection process that the failure to remove a 
prospective juror was not the product of a conscious choice or preference"; (2) "a 
prospective juror expressed bias so strong or unequivocal that no plausible countervailing 
subjective preference could justify failure to remove that juror"; or (3) "there is some 
other specific evidence clearly demonstrating that counsel's choice was not plausibly 
justifiable." Id. 
Finally, the burden is on defendant to prove his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim on appeal and to ensure that the record is adequate for him to do so. Id. at f16 . 
The natural consequence of that burden "is that an appellate court will presume that any 
argument of ineffectiveness presented to it is supported by all the relevant evidence of 
which defendant is aware." Id. at ^ 17. "Where the record appears inadequate in any 
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fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor 
of a finding that counsel performed effectively." Id. 
Defendant has not overcome any of the foregoing presumptions with respect to his 
trial counsel's decision to not remove Juror Williams. Indeed, defendant's claim rests 
entirely on his assumption that Juror Williams was biased against him. See Aplt. Br. at 30 
(asserting that Williams had "an obvious conflict of interest that inevitably tainted the 
trial process"). Defendant makes that assumption based solely on the fact of Williams's 
employment as a secretary to the court administrator and her short, unspecified, prior 
working relationship with the prosecutor. Id. Defendant does not assert that Juror 
Williams had prior knowledge of his case, only that her courthouse employment 
constituted an "obvious conflict of interest." Id. 
Notably, defendant points to no statute or court rule mandating "that prejudice is to 
be presumed from one's employment as a deputy clerk," let alone an administrative 
secretary, as in this case. State v. McKinney, 609 N.E.2d 613, 617 (Ohio App. 1992) 
(rejecting McKinney's claim that defense counsel was constitutionally deficient for not 
objecting to juror who was also a deputy court clerk). Nor does he point to any case 
law—and the State is aware of none—holding that court personnel or any "state employee 
is [] or . . . automatically disqualified from serving as a juror where the state is a party and 
where actual bias is lacking." Id. (citation omitted). See also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 
209, 222 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Some examples [of implied bias] might 
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include a revelation that the juror is an actual employee of the prosecuting agency, that 
the juror is a close relative of one of the participants in the trial or the criminal 
transaction, or that the juror was a witness or somehow involved in the criminal 
transaction"). 
To the contrary, defendant recognizes that this Court has "concluded that ties to 
law enforcement by potential jurors did not establish bias." Aplt. Br. at 30. Defendant 
relies on State v. Ramos, 882 P.2d 149 (Utah App. 1994), to support bis claim. But, in 
rejecting Ramos's claim of juror bias, this Court found it significant that the juror at issue, 
who had spent twenty years as a police dispatcher, never made any statement indicating 
bias based on his former occupation. Id. at 152-54. Rather, the Court observed that 
Ramos's objection to the juror was based solely on the juror's comments reflecting his 
law enforcement background and experience. Id. at 153-54. Accordingly, the juror's 
statement that his prior law enforcement experience would not affect his opinion sufficed 
to dispel any possible question of bias in that case. Id. at 154. The same result should 
obtain here. Because Juror Williams never made any statement indicating bias based on 
her employment as secretary to the court administrator or her prior unspecified working 
relationship with the prosecutor, her denial that her work experience would affect her 
opinion in this case sufficed to dispel any possible question of bias. See R138:9; see also 
Ramos, 882 P.2d at 154. 
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Defendant seeks to distinguish the result in Ramos by alleging that Juror 
Williams's employment "by the court charged with administering justice in this matter," 
together with her "previous working relationship" with the prosecutor, suggests a stronger 
possibility of bias than did the Ramos juror's former law enforcement experience. See 
Aplt. Br. at 30 ("An independent judiciary is one of the basic tenets of American 
government and jurisprudence. Essentially [Juror Williams] and Judge Harding were 
colleagues in the judicial branch of Utah government"). Defendant's attempt to 
distinguish Ramos fails for essentially two reasons. First, a juror who is also a court 
employee "does not give rise to the same inference of bias or prejudice which arises from 
a relationship or close acquaintance with law enforcement or prosecutorial officers 
charged with an adversarial function." State v. Brown, 355 S.E.2d 614, 620 (W.Va. 
1987). Second, although Juror Williams had previously worked with the prosecutor for a 
short period of time, she was serving as a court employee at the time she was called to 
jury duty. R138:26. Juror Williams felt comfortable referring to the prosecutor by her 
first name, but she also assured the trial court that her prior working relationship with the 
prosecutor would not affect her ability to be fair and impartial in this case. R138:10. 
Defendant thus has presented nothing that would support a conclusion that Juror Williams 
was biased as a matter of law. Although defendant asserts that Juror Williams should 
have been further questioned, he does not identify those questions, let alone demonstrate 
that Juror Williams was biased, given that the trial court questioned Juror Williams as to 
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her "ability to be unbiased and to fairly evaluate the evidence, and the trial court, as well 
as trial counsel, were apparently satisfied with [Juror Williams's] responses." State v. 
Robertson, 2005 UT App 419, ffif 10-11, 122 P.3d 895 (rejecting Robertson's claim that 
juror whose brother-in-law was employed in law enforcement was biased as a matter of 
law). 
Moreover, as in every criminal case, trial counsel "had an opportunity to examine . 
. . each juror's body language and facial expressions, and the reactions that each juror had 
to the information that was presented to them." Id. at f^ 11. Thus, trial counsel "easily 
could have identified some factor present in any or all of these observations that led him 
to believe that [Juror Williams was] well suited to serve on [defendant's] jury." Id. This 
view is made all the more likely by trial counsel's decision to challenge Juror Douglas, 
who was also a court employee, but not Juror Williams. See R138:38-39. Because trial 
counsel unsuccessfully challenged and ultimately used a peremptory challenge on Juror 
Douglas, it is reasonable to infer that "trial counsel discerned some qualitative difference" 
between Juror Douglas, the court clerk he challenged for cause, and Juror Williams, the 
court administrative secretary whom he did not challenge.3 State v. Simmons, 2000 UT 
App 190, \ 16, 5 P.3d 1228 (inferring "from trial counsel's different treatment of the two 
3Defendant sought remand on this question under rule 23B, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. See Rule 23B Motion for Remand, dated 15 December 2006. This 
Court denied the motion because defendant failed "to set forth any nonspeculative facts 
that establish ineffective assistance and resulting prejudice." See Order, dated 5 March 
2007. 
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prospective jurors that 'trial counsel discerned some qualitative difference between the 
juror he challenged for cause and those he did not'55 (citation and alterations omitted)). 
See also State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, ^ 19, 153 P.3d 804 (rejecting Alfatlawi's 
claim that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective where trial counsel actively 
participated injury selection). 
In sum, because defendant fails to provide any basis for finding that Juror 
Williams was biased as a matter of law or fact, or that Juror Williams expressed bias so 
strong or unequivocal that no plausible countervailing subjective preference could justify 
failure to remove her, and because trial counsel was anything but inattentive or indifferent 
during the jury selection process, this Court should reject defendant's claim that trial 
counsel was constitutionally ineffective "for his choices in juror selection." Robertson, 
2005 UT App 4194 11. 
2. Defendant also has shown no prejudice. 
Based on the above, trial counsel acted objectively reasonably in retaining Juror 
Williams. Therefore, there is no need to reach Strickland's requirement of prejudice. 
See Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, If 19 (declining to reach prejudice prong of 
ineffectiveness claim where Alfatlawi failed to establish that his trial counsel performed 
deficiently in retaining allegedly biased juror). 
In any event, defendant has not proven that trial counsel's alleged deficient 
performance in retaining Juror Williams prejudiced him. Strickland's prejudice prong 
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can be met "only by showing there is a reasonable probability that 'but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" State v. 
Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 466 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). In this context the 
claimed prejudice is not the resulting guilty verdict, but that counsel's alleged deficient 
performance resulted in a biased juror sitting. Thus, an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim "premised on failure to challenge a juror for cause can succeed only if the juror was 
biased as a matter of law." Robertson, 2005 UT App 419, \ 9 (additional quotation and 
citation omitted); see also Simmons, 2000 UT App 190, f 12. Defendant has not made 
that showing. 
First, like defendant's claim of deficient performance, his claim of prejudice rises 
or falls on defendant's assumption that Juror Williams's employment as the court 
administrator's secretary together with her former working relationship with the 
prosecutor rendered her biased as a matter of law. Aplt. Br. 29-30. For all the reasons 
stated in Point 11(A)(1), supra, defendant's assertion lacks merit. Defendant provides no 
authority that court employees are biased as a matter of law, nor does he provide any 
authority that jurors with ties to the prosecution are biased as a matter of law. He 
therefore fails to demonstrate that Juror Williams was actually biased or that any 
prejudice occurred here. He thus fails to show that trial counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective in retaining Juror Williams. 
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B. Defendant has not shown plain error. 
Defendant alternatively claims that the trial court plainly erred in not sua sponte 
removing Juror Williams. Aplt. Br. at 26. As set forth in Point 1(B), supra, to prevail on 
a claim of plain error, defendant must show "that the trial court committed an error that 
was both obvious and prejudicial." Cruz, 2005 UT 45, \ 24. But a defendant can prevail 
on a claim of plain error c"[o]nly where a juror expresses a bias or conflict of interest that 
is so strong or unequivocal as to inevitably taint the trial process should a trial court 
overrule trial counsel's conscious decision to retain a questionable juror."" Alfatlawi, 
2006 UT App 511, If 21 (quoting Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 32). See also State v. King, 
2006 UT 3, ffi[ 22-23, 131 P.3d 202 (same). This is because "[i]t is generally 
inappropriate for a trial court to interfere with counsel's conscious choices in the jury 
selection process . . . ." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 32. For all the reasons set out in Point 
11(A), supra, defendant has not demonstrated that Juror Williams's current or past 
employment gave rise to a bias or conflict so strong or unequivocal as to inevitably taint 
the trial process such that the trial court should overrule rial counsel's conscious decision 
to retain her. See McKinney, 609 N.E.2d at 617 (declining to presume prejudice from 
fact of juror's employment as deputy court clerk). See also Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, 
\ 22 ("The simple fact that a potential juror may have ties to law enforcement does not 
establish bias" (citing Ramos, 882 P.2d at 152)); Brown, 355 S.E.2d at 620 (holding juror 
who is also a court employee "does not give rise to the same inference of bias or prejudice 
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which arises from relationship or close acquaintance with law enforcement or 
prosecutorial officers charged with an adversarial function"). Because defendant has not 
and cannot show that Juror Williams was actually biased against him, he cannot show 
prejudicial error. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BASED ON 
HIS CLAIM THAT HE WAS SURPRISED BY ADMISSIBLE 
EVIDENCE—A RECORDING OF HIS POLICE 
INTERVIEW—WHERE HE NEVER SOUGHT A CONTINUANCE 
IN THE TRIAL COURT 
In Point III of his brief, defendant asserts that "the trial court erred in admitting the 
audiotape of the police interrogation of [defendant] where the State violated rule 16 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure." Aplt. Br. at 32 (capitalization and holding omitted). 
Defendant's claim is foreclosed because he never sought a continuance. 
Proceedings below. During the State's case-in-chief, Lieutenant Fox testified 
regarding the substance of his interview with defendant. Rl 38:115; R3 88:9. According 
to Lieutenant Fox, defendant initially claimed that he visited Judy Tidwell's house only 
one time. R138:116. When challenged, however, defendant admitted to having lied 
about that. Id; R388:29-30. 
When defendant testified later that day, he denied having admitted to lying during 
the police interview. Rl 3 8:200. Therefore, at the conclusion of the first day of trial, 
following defendant's testimony, and after the defense had rested, the prosecutor asked to 
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play portions of defendant's recorded police interview to "rebut the statements of the 
defendant denying that he said certain things to Lieutenant Fox." R388:20; see also 
R138:206. Defendant objected on the ground that he was surprised that the interview had 
been recorded. Id. 
The matter was addressed again the next morning, the second day of trial. See 
R388:4. Defendant moved to suppress the recording on the grounds that he was not given 
a Miranda warning, and that he was "unaware of the tape recording . . . until after [his] 
testimony." Id. at 8; see also id. at 7.4 Trial counsel argued that because police withheld 
the recording from both the prosecutor and defendant, "it ought to be suppressed." Id. at 
8. He did not request a continuance. Id. 
The trial court denied the motion to suppress, ruling that the recording was 
admissible to rebut defendant's trial testimony. Id. Although trial counsel continued to 
object to the recording on the grounds of Miranda and surprise, he concurred that the 
recording was admissible for rebuttal purposes. See id. at 20 ("No objection to the tape 
being admitted for that purpose"); see also id. at 21. Portions of the recording were then 
played for the jurors, who were instructed that it was "simply for that limited rebuttal 
purpose," and that "[t]he purpose . . . was to determine the testimony of the defendant as 
Apparently, the microphone was hidden in the ceiling of the room where 
defendant was interviewed. R3 88:21. 
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it relate[d] on the tape as compared to his statements on the stand relative to that same 
examination." Id. at 22. 
Following the playing of portions of the recording at trial, see id. the State again 
rested, and defendant again took the stand. Id. at 26. Defendant acknowledged that the 
recording was a "fairly accurate reflection of the interview." Id. He also testified that he 
was nervous and confused during the police interview, and that he did not "remember a 
lot of things about the interview." Id. at 28. On cross-examination, defendant affirmed 
that he had previously testified that he did not tell Lieutenant Fox that he had lied to him 
during the interview, but that the recording of the interview reflected that he did make 
such a statement to Lieutenant Fox "at the beginning" of the interview. Id. at 28-29 
("That's what the tape said. I still don't remember"). 
A. Because defendant did not request a continuance to meet the 
unexpected evidence, he is foreclosed from relief on appeal. 
On appeal, defendant no longer challenges the admissibility of his recorded police 
interview under Miranda, or on any other ground than that of surprise. Aplt. Br. at 32-
36. However, if defendant was surprised by the recording at trial, he should have asked 
for a continuance. 
"In criminal prosecutions, the State has two independent obligations to provide 
evidence to the defense." State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211, ^  34, 52 P.3d 451. "First, the 
State has a duty under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution to 
provide, without request by the defendant, all exculpatory evidence." Id. (case citation 
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omitted). Additionally, the State has a duty under rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, to provide, upon order of the court or the request of the defendant, any 
inculpatory evidence. Id. at fflj 34-35. "Whether prosecutors produce inculpatory 
evidence under court order or on request, they have a duty to comply fully and 
forthrightly." Id. at f^ 35. If the prosecutor discloses inculpatory evidence, "the 
prosecutor has a continuing obligation to disclose newly acquired information so as to 
avoid misleading the defense." Id. But, when a defendant is confronted with 
unanticipated evidence, he "essentially waive[s] his right to later claim error if [he] fails 
to request a continuance or seek other appropriate relief under Rule 16(g)." Id. at \ 37 
(case citation and quotation omitted) (first brackets in original). 
As noted above, defendant no longer claims that his recorded police interview 
should have been suppressed due to an alleged Miranda violation, and for good reason. 
"Even assuming [defendant's] statements were taken in violation of Miranda . . . , they 
were offered on rebuttal only for purposes of impeachment and as such are admissible." 
State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 282 (Utah 1989) (case citations omitted). Rather than 
reassert a Miranda violation, defendant asserts that he is entitled to a reversal based only 
on his allegation of surprise, or that a discovery violation occurred on two arguably 
alternative grounds. First, recognizing that he never filed a written discovery motion, 
defendant suggests that the prosecutor nonetheless violated rule 16 by failing to disclose 
the recording of his police interview because the prosecutor had "provided various police 
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reports." Aplt. Br. at 34. Therefore, defendant reasons, the State incurred a continuing 
obligation to disclose newly-acquired information under rule 16(g). Aplt. Br. at 34. See 
also Perez, 2002 UT App 211, j^ 35. Additionally, although he never claims a due 
process violation, defendant suggests that the recording "was potentially exculpatory 
evidence," implying the recording should have been disclosed irrespective of rule 16(g). 
Aplt. Br. at 35 ("[Defendant] asserts that the audiotape of his interrogation by law 
enforcement was potentially exculpatory evidence . . . . [accordingly, the duty of the 
prosecution to disclose such evidence was violated by law enforcement's withholding of 
it"). 
Assuming arguendo that a discovery violation occurred, if defendant was 
surprised, he should have sought a continuance. As noted above, when confronted with 
unexpected but otherwise admissible evidence, a defendant "'essentially waive[s] his 
right to later claim error' if the defendant fails to request a continuance or seek other 
appropriate relief under Rule 16(g)." Perez, 2002 UT App 211, ^ 37 (case citation and 
quotation omitted). See also State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 n.6 (Utah 1987) 
(recognizing that the failure to seek a continuance or to otherwise mitigate prejudice 
resulting from a discovery violation "is significant"); State v. Workman, 635 P.2d 49, 53 
(Utah 1981) (rejecting Workman's claim of surprise and consequent prejudice resulting 
from the State's alleged failure to disclose the full content of statements he allegedly 
made to a witness where Workman "did [not] seek a continuance of trial to overcome the 
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claimed element of surprise"). Because defendant did not assert that a continuance was 
necessary in order to mitigate his claimed surprise, see Rl 83:206; R388:20, he is 
foreclosed from relief on appeal. See State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah 1988) 
(holding that Griffith's failure to move for a continuance constituted a waiver of relief 
under rule 16(g)); State v. Rugebregt, 965 P.2d 518, 523 (Utah App. 1998) (same). 
B. Defendant suffered no prejudice. 
Notwithstanding his failure to mitigate his claimed surprise, defendant asserts that 
prejudice "must be presumed because the record is inadequate for this [Cjourt to properly 
consider [the recording's] impact upon the jury and its impact upon [his] defense." Aplt. 
Br. at 35. Defendant's claim of prejudice is based on his speculation that the recording, 
which "was not transcribed and apparently no longer exists," "was potentially exculpatory 
evidence." Id. 
Regardless of whether the recording is properly characterized as inculpatory or 
exculpatory, prejudice is not presumed merely because a defendant is surprised by 
otherwise admissible evidence. Rather, "a breach of discovery rules does not warrant 
reversal absent a showing of prejudice to the defendant." State v. Blair, 868 P.2d 802, 
807 (Utah 1993) (citation omitted); see also State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 274-75 
(Utah 1998) ("Unless a review of the record shows that the court's decision is plainly 
wrong in that the defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial, we will not find 
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tha t . . . the court's decision was an abuse of discretion." (quotations and citations 
omitted)). Moreover, unless or until "defendant can make a credible argument that the 
prosecutor's errors have impaired the defense," the burden never shifts to the State to 
show "that there is no reasonable likelihood that absent the error, the outcome of trial 
would have been more favorable for the defendant." Knight, 734 P.2d at 921. As shown 
below, defendant has not demonstrated any prejudice on this record. 
First, contrary to defendant's assertion, the record is more than adequate to 
determine that the recording was not exculpatory. It is clear that the defense had access to 
the recording overnight and that trial counsel listened to it in preparing the motion to 
suppress. See e.g., R138:206; R388:4-20. If there was anything exculpatory in the 
recording, presumably trial counsel would have sought to admit, rather than suppress, the 
recording. Moreover, if the recording was exculpatory, presumably, the State would not 
have sought to impeach defendant with it. 
Second, defendant was not surprised by any new substantive evidence. Defendant 
and trial counsel were fully aware before trial that defendant was interviewed by 
Lieutenant Fox. Indeed, Lieutenant Fox testified as to his memory of the interview 
during the State's case in chief. See, e.g., R138:l 15-117. Defendant also testified as to 
his memory of the interview. See e.g., Rl 3 8:198-200. Therefore, the recording of that 
interview, which was admitted only to rebut or impeach defendant's recollection of his 
statement, was cumulative of Lieutenant Fox's earlier testimony. Cf. State v. Boyd, 2001 
44 
UT 305 f 28, 25 P.3d 985 ("As a general rule, newly discovered evidence does not 
warrant a new trial where its only use is impeachment") (citation omitted). 
Third, rebuttal testimony is not the kind of surprise testimony that justifies a new 
trial. See State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 850 (Utah 1988) (holding that doctor's 
"rebuttal testimony" did "not constitute the kind of surprise that justifies a new trial"). 
Indeed, in asking this Court to presume prejudice, defendant does not assert that he would 
have conducted his defense any differently if had only known of the recording before 
trial. Aplt. Br. at 32-36. See also Knight, 734 P.2d at 921 (requiring defendants to make 
a "credible argument" that an alleged discovery violation "impaired" the defense before 
burden will shift to the State to show "that there is no reasonable likelihood that absent 
the error, the outcome of trial would have been more favorable"). In any event, the most 
that defendant arguably could have done here, had he known of the recording before he 
testified, and presumably refreshed his memory, would have been to acknowledge to the 
jury that he had told Lieutenant Fox that he lied during the interview. But defendant got 
that opportunity when he testified on surrebuttal. Defendant told the jury that he was 
nervous and confused during the interview, and that he did not "remember a lot of things 
about the interview," but that the recording reflected that he did make such a statement to 
Lieutenant Fox. Id. at 28-29 ("That's what the tape said. I still don't remember"). 
In short, because the recording contained information of which trial counsel and 
defendant were already aware, and because in asking this Court to presume prejudice, 
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defendant has not put forward a credible demonstration of how he would have conducted 
his defense differently, defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced by the 
prosecutor's failure to disclose the recording's existence before trial. See Knight, 734 
P.2d at 921; see also Blair, 868 P.2d 807-08 (declining to find "prejudice resulting from 
the prosecution's failure to provide a copy of the transcript of Blair's statement," where 
Blair's counsel was advised that he had made a statement and "because the statement 
contained information of which Blair's counsel was already aware"). He is not, therefore, 
entitled to a reversal on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's jury conviction for rape should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on 8th August 2007. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
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C 
West's Utah Court Rules Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
Part II. Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice 
KM Chapter 13. Rules of Professional Conduct (Refs & Annos) 
Kd Client-lawyer Relationship 
-•RULE 1.7. CONFLICT OF INTEREST: CURRENT CLIENTS 
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if 
the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent 
conflict of interest exists if: 
(a)(1) The representation of one client will be directly adverse to another 
client; or 
(a) (2) There is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients 
will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a 
former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer. 
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under 
paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if: 
(b)(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide 
competent and diligent representation to each affected client; 
(b)(2) the representation is not prohibited by law; 
(b)(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client 
against another client represented by the lawyer m the same litigation or other 
proceeding before a tribunal; and 
(b)(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. 
[Amended effective November 1, 2001; November 1, 2005.] 
COMMENT 
General Principles 
[1] Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements m the lawyer's 
relationship to a client. Concurrent conflicts of interest can arise from the 
lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or 
from the lawyer's own interests. For specific rules regarding certain concurrent 
conflicts of interest, see Rule 1.8. For former client conflicts of interest, see 
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West's Utah Court Rules Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
Part II. Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice 
M Chapter 13. Rules of Professional Conduct (Refs & Annos) 
"Si Client-lawyer Relationship 
-+RULE 1.9. DUTIES TO FORMER CLIENTS 
(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not 
thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter 
in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the 
former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in 
writing. 
(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially 
related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had 
previously represented a client 
(b) (1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and 
(b) (2) about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and 
1.9(c) that is material to the matter; unless the former client gives informed 
consent, confirmed in writing. 
(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or 
former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter: 
(c)(1) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the 
former client except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a 
client, or when the information has become generally known; or 
(c) (2) reveal information relating to the representation except as these Rules 
would permit or require with respect to a client. 
[Amended effective November 1, 2005.] 
COMMENT 
[1] After termination of a client-lawyer relationship, a lawyer has certain 
continuing duties with respect to confidentiality and conflicts of interest and 
thus may not represent another client except in conformity with this Rule. Under 
this Rule, for example, a lawyer could not properly seek to rescind on behalf of a 
new client a contract drafted on behalf of the former client. So also a lawyer 
who has prosecuted an accused person could not properly represent the accused in a 
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West's Utah Court Rules Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
Part II. Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice 
Kd Chapter 13. Rules of Professional Conduct (Refs & Annos) 
*E2 Client-lawyer Relationship 
-•RULE 1.10. IMPUTATION OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: GENERAL RULE 
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly 
represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from 
doing so by Rules 1.7 or 1.9, unless the prohibition is based on a personal 
interest of the prohibited lawyer and does not present a significant risk of 
materially limiting the representation of the client by the remaining lawyers in 
the firm. 
(b) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not 
prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse 
to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer and not 
currently represented by the firm, unless: 
(b)(1) the matter is the same or substantially related to that m which the 
formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and 
(b)(2) any lawyer remaining m the firm has information protected by Rules 1.6 and 
1.9(c) that is material to the matter. 
(c) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, no lawyer associated in the firm 
shall knowingly represent a person in a matter in which that lawyer is 
disqualified under Rule 1.9 unless: 
(c)(1) the personally disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any 
participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom, and 
(c)(2) written notice is promptly given to any affected former client. 
(d) A disqualification prescribed by this Rule may be waived by the affected 
client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7. 
(e) The disqualification of lawyers associated in a firm with former or current 
government lawyers is governed by Rule 1.11. 
[Amended effective November 1, 2005.] 
COMMENT 
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West's Utah Court Rules Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
Part II. Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice 
M Chapter 13. Rules of Professional Conduct (Refs & Annos) 
*ii Client-lawyer Relationship 
-fRULE 1.11. SPECIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST FOR FORMER AND CURRENT 
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 
(a) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer who has formerly 
served as a public officer or employee of the government: 
(a)(1) is subject to Rule 1.9(c); and 
(a)(2) shall not otherwise represent a client in connection with a matter in which 
the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or 
employee, unless the appropriate government agency gives its informed consent, 
confirmed in writing, to the representation. 
(b) When a lawyer is disqualified from representation under paragraph (a), no 
lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or 
continue representation in such a matter unless: 
(b)(1) the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the 
matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and 
(b)(2) written notice is promptly given to the appropriate government agency to 
enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this Rule. 
(c) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer having information that 
the lawyer knows is confidential government information about a person acquired 
when the lawyer was a public officer or employee may not represent a private 
client whose interests are adverse to that person in a matter in which the 
information could be used to the material disadvantage of that person. As used in 
this Rule, the term "confidential government information" means information that 
has been obtained under governmental authority and which at the time the Rule is 
applied, the government is prohibited by law from disclosing to the public or has 
a legal privilege not to disclose and which is not otherwise available to the 
public. A firm with which that lawyer is associated may undertake or continue 
representation in the matter only if the disqualified lawyer is screened from any 
participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom. 
(d) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer serving as a public 
officer or employee: 
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(d)(1) is subject to Rules 1.7 and 1.9; and 
(d)(2) shall not: 
(d)(2)(I) participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and 
substantially while in private practice or nongovernmental employment, unless the 
appropriate government agency gives its informed consent, confirmed m writing; o 
(d)(2) (n) negotiate for private employment with any person who is involved as a 
party or as lawyer for a party m a matter in which the lawyer is participating 
personally and substantially, except that a lawyer serving as a law clerk to a 
judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for private 
employment as permitted by Rule 1.12(b) and subject to the conditions stated in 
Rule 1.12(b). 
(e) As used in this Rule, the term "matter" includes: 
(e)(1) any judicial or other proceeding, application, request for a ruling or 
other determination, contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, 
accusation, arrest or other particular matter involving a specific party or 
parties; and 
(e)(2) any other matter covered by the conflict of interest rules of the 
appropriate government agency. 
[Amended effective November 1, 2005.] 
COMMENT 
[1] A lawyer, who has served or is currently serving as a public office or 
employee is personally subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct, including the 
prohibition against concurrent conflicts of interest stated m Rule 1.7 In 
addition, such a lawyer may be subject to statutes and government regulations 
regarding conflicts of interest. Such statutes and regulations may circumscribe 
the extent to which the government agency may give consent under this Rule. See 
Rule 1.0(e) for the definition of informed consent. 
[2] Paragraphs (a)(1), (a)(2) and (d)(1) restate the obligations of an individual 
lawyer who has served or is currently serving as an officer or employee of the 
government toward a former government or private client. Rule 1.10 is not 
applicable to the conflicts of interest addressed by this Rule. Rather, paragraph 
(b) sets forth a special imputation rule for former government lawyers that 
provides for screening and notice. Because of the special problems raised by 
imputation within a government agency, paragraph (d) does not impute the conflicts 
of a lawyer currently serving as an officer or employee of the government to other 
associated government officers or employees, although ordinarily it will be 
prudent to screen such lawyers. 
[3] Paragraphs (a)(2) and (d)(2) apply regardless of whether a lawyer is adverse 
to a former client and are thus designed not only to protect the former client, 
but also to prevent a lawyer from exploiting public office for the advantage of 
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